

History 7042 Additional Specimen Question Paper 1A (A-level) Question 1 Student 2 Specimen Answer and Commentary

V1.0

Specimen answer plus commentary

The following student response is intended to illustrate approaches to assessment. This response has not been completed under timed examination conditions. It is not intended to be viewed as a 'model' answer and the marking has not been subject to the usual standardisation process.

Additional Specimen QP:

01 Using your understanding of the historical context, assess how convincing the arguments in these three extracts are in relation to the reasons why the Kingdom of Jerusalem collapsed.

[30 marks]

The main thrust of Phillips' argument in Extract A is that the Kingdom of Jerusalem was incredibly unlucky in the years leading up to its collapse in 1187. Whilst he is willing to accept that, on occasion, personal rivalries and internal political conflicts made the problems for Jerusalem worse, Phillips does not think that the collapse was in any way 'inevitable' after the accession of the Leper-King Baldwin in 1174. Indeed, the Extract actually argues in favour of Baldwin's capability as a leader and points out that Saladin's rise to power and supremacy within the Muslim world was, in no way, inevitable or predictable.

This argument is quite convincing. Indeed, the turning point, if there was even one, certainly did not come with the death of Amalric in 1174. Baldwin, despite his affliction, was a capable and inspiring leader who inflicted a crushing defeat upon Saladin at Mt. Gisard in 1177. Indeed, by 1179 he was building a great fortress at Jacob's Ford which might have turned the tide in his favour; we know this as Saladin was offering huge bribes to prevent the construction of the castle. Saladin would be forced to seek truces with the Kingdom of Jerusalem on numerous occasions, mainly because his control over Syria and the Jazeera was not complete until his submission of Mosul in 1185. Saladin spent much of his career fighting other Muslims and the image of him as a jihadi warrior fighting the Christian 'infidel' is one created by his own propagandists with the hindsight of his great victories in 1187. So therefore, it can be seen that the Kingdom was incredibly unlucky to face, for the first time, a truly united Muslim world, at the same time as the power vacuum which attended the early deaths of both Baldwin IV and V.

However, the fact that this interpretation downplays the role of internal conflicts in the collapse of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, makes the extract less convincing. In the long term these issues were not paramount, but in the fateful year of 1187 they took centre stage. It was at this point that Baldwin IV's prior inability to control and appease the two competing factions at court came to a head as Sybil and her husband Guy seized power and Raymond III actively helped Saladin by giving him free passage into his lands. The tensions which would prove so disastrous in 1187 had all been cultivated in the early 1180s as Baldwin IV's own illness became increasingly debilitating and his constant vacillating between the two sides led to a power struggle after his death. Guy's own decision to meet Saladin in battle in 1187 can only be understood within the context of the political wrangling of Baldwin IV's reign; in 1182 Guy had refused to fight Saladin in open battle and had been called a coward, now he faced the same charge again should he not offer battle. Thus he took the less pragmatic course of action in an attempt to secure his own fragile grip on the crown.

In Extract B, Tyerman argues that internal political factions and poor leadership combined with existing long term problems to cause the collapse in 1187. He sees the reign of Amalric as significant and argues that from here on political instability became worse and worse.

This was very noticeable, even at the time, but what was even more of an issue was the underlying lack of money and manpower- which wasn't so obvious at the time. Tyerman argues that the ruling class became embroiled in costly and distracting internal rivalries and so the deeper issues were neglected.

In many ways this is quite convincing. Internal faction was certainly a huge issue in 1187 when Guy changed his mind at the last minute, deciding to march to Tiberias despite the advice of Raymond of Tripoli that this was a suicidal decision. Guy and Raymond were old political rivals and there was no trust between them. These rivalries were also a contributing factor to the lukewarm help from the West provided in the last decade or so. Tyerman's view is also convincing as it cannot be denied that Outremer had a long term problem of chronic overreliance on the West for reinforcements and donations. This was made even worse when the enemy in the 1180s was Saladin, a man who controlled the extensive wealth of Egypt. One of the reasons why Jerusalem's defeat was so complete after Hattin was because there was a lack of manpower available to garrison the castles and cities. Guy had called out the arriere-ban and had emptied the treasury to pay for the 1187 campaign, leaving the Kingdom with nothing to fall back on.

However, this extract seems to blame the Kingdom of Jerusalem entirely for its own decline. Despite issues of finance and manpower, the Military Orders provided a useful answer to an intractable problem and, so long as an all-out decisive conflict was avoided, then it would have been possible for the Kingdom to survive beyond 1187. The events during the Third Crusade highlight that Saladin's own grip on his troops was quite fragile and he would surely not have been able to spend countless years investing the myriad of great crusader castles protecting the kingdom. Thus Saladin had to work to effect a decisive battle in 1187, which he managed at Hattin.

In Extract C Runciman takes a more unusual view and focuses on the collapse of the Crusader States from the perspective of Byzantium. He argues that, until their defeat at the hands of the Turks at Myriocephalum in 1176, the Eastern Empire provided help and support for the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Runciman also argues that the Empire provided a distraction to the leaders of Islam and that, from this point on, no such safeguard remained. He also discusses the lack of help from the West, which caused further issues for Outremer.

In some ways this view is convincing. Certainly, since the late 1150s, the relations between the two sides improved with marriage alliances and combined military engagements following on; most notably in Egypt under King Amalric of Jerusalem. Runciman is correct in pointing out that contact from the West after the failure of the Second Crusade was sporadic and, despite promises from the kings of France and England, practical help only materialised on isolated occasions. With this in mind, the Byzantines were the Kingdom of Jerusalem's closest natural ally and they were powerful enough to cause problems for Saladin, especially in Egypt.

However, this view is also less than convincing on many levels. The source presupposes that the Empire would have continued to work in close collaboration with Jerusalem. In fact, the real turning point in relations seems to have come after the death of Emperor Manuel in 1180, his successor was quite violently anti-Latin and it is unlikely that he would have provided support, even if he had felt able to. Indeed, he went on to sign an alliance with Saladin not to interfere in his plans. This sits within a wider history of Byzantine-Crusader relations which were often fraught and it is difficult to argue that the Eastern Empire had played much of a practical role in maintaining the States until this point; thus it is hard to be convinced by Runciman's view of why the Kingdom collapsed in 1187.

Commentary - Level 5

This is a well-balanced answer which clearly assesses the degree to which each extract has convincing arguments. Deployment of contextual knowledge is effective and appropriate. The only limitation is that of comprehensive coverage of the arguments in the extracts. For example, the opening of Extract B suggests more than the argument that is identified in the answer and there is no reference to the issue of the possibility, or lack of it, of Western European aid that is suggested in Extract C. It is, therefore, a good Level 4 answer.